What will happen when Lawrence Wong becomes Singapore's next prime minister?

Pencil in the date on your calendar (or calendar app)! Barring any unforeseen circumstances like a natural disaster, foreign invasion, or catastrohpic illness, Lee Hsien Loong will finally step down and make way for a capable, able-bodied, and willing successor. Lawrence Wong will indeed become Singapore's 4th prime minister on 15 May 2024.

Yet the emerging details of the handover are of concern and raise questions about the governing capacity of the Lawrence Wong premiership. When Mr Wong takes over, he does so under the mentorship of Lee, and without any immediate change in policy or a major reshuffle of the cabinet.

Wong's sound and reassuring reasoning that Singapore's "system works on the basis of continuity and progressive change" still begs the question: Why should the nation wait till after the next general election to find out his personal vision and roadmap for the country, his policy direction, and the leadership renewal that will accompany these changes in the cabinet? Even the alleged "seatwarmer" Goh Chok Tong promised a kinder, gentler, more consultative Singapore before his maiden election, clearly communicating a clear difference in style, vision, and mode of governance.

Is Singapore's model for political succession flawed?

The problematic succession of Lawrence Wong highlights the biggest weaknesses of Singapore's leadership succession model, as outlined here previously.

The more terms a prime minister serves, the greater the tendency towards the concentration of power, authority, and decision-making as more of his cohort retires from politics. From being the primus inter pares at the beginning of his tenure (if that claim can be taken seriously), the prime minister gradually takes on an imperial authority overseeing much junior, less politically experienced ministers. That pseudo-imperial authority waxes to its maximum when the prime minister steps down and remains in cabinet as a "senior minister".

Political longevity causes successful public policies associated with the prime minister to become orthodoxy, to be questioned at the peril of one's career in politics and public service. A successful policy may solve a social, economic, or political problem of its age. When it becomes settled as political orthodoxy, a once-successful and relevant policy begins to drift from its social, economic, and political mooring. Policy once appropriate for its times loses relevance, and becomes the wrong prescription for different problems faced in a different time. The end result is policy failure.

Sir Humphrey Appleton provides the best argument for sunset clauses in public policy 

In the worst case scenario, by Wong's failure to articulate from Day 0 an outline for his incoming government, Lee enters office on 15 May with a pseudo-imperial authority, while Wong enters office on the same day as a hardworking but lame duck, unable to deal with problems that urgently need addressing with full authority and vigour.

But what if everything changed in 2011 and no one noticed?

We at Illusio offer a counter-proposal: is it possible that Singapore's political succession model has been quietly changed or tweaked behind the scenes? We approach this from the perspective of game theory.

The model made perfect sense when Lee Kuan Yew stepped down in 1990. While suffering his peak of political unpopularity, the elder Lee still commanded, however misplaced, the atavistic loyalty of a large portion of the electorate and civil service. Around Lee grew, much to his protestations, a popular cult of personality and senior civil servants of varying competence emulating his iron-fisted style as "mini Lee Kuan Yews".

Even if Lee was unwilling to stay on, the public at large, the civil service (or deep state as it is called these days), and the party needed reassurance on Lee's continued leadership.

Column of Antonius Pius, apotheosis

Yet 2024 is not 1990; circumstances and contexts have changed, and Singapore has become a much different polity. In 2011, the model was all but abolished when Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Chok Tong simultaneously became "emeritus" minister mentor and "emeritus" senior minister, purely honorary titles without a place in the cabinet ostensibly to allow Lee Hsien Loong to have a "fresh team, a fresh look on problems". The younger Lee did not have a senior minister in his cabinet again until 2019, when an ageing Teo Chee Hean was promoted out of his deputy prime minister post. His role? Not to watch over Lee or guide the cabinet but to vaguely "lend support". 

Did the senior minister position then become a means to ease out senior, honored, but ultimately retiring leaders? Is that Lee's plan for himself? As a reductio ad absurdum, imagine if the very consensual prime minister Lee, who has previously delegated decision-making and distributed policy-setting in his post-2011 cabinets, has a change of heart on 16 May and decides to create a personal larger-than-life brand, and exercises far more executive and imperial control as a senior minister. It is simply unthinkable.

Meet the new boss, same as the old boss (but not in the way you think)

From 2011 to 2024, it is somewhat true that Lee's cabinet has been more willing to take "a fresh look on problems". To some degree, policy reviews have taken place. Singapore's leaders now publicly talk about "pain points" to justify when existing policies should be revised or their assumptions questioned. These not quite admissions of policy failure still led to more policy adjustment and discussions in Lee's latter administration.

It may be that the post-Lee era arrived in 2011 under the leadership and direction of Lee himself, and no one noticed. That might be the reason why Wong is offering no new ideas today - because after 2011, all the "fresh look on problems" were the new ideas of a consensual and collective cabinet of which he has been a part. In that case, this might be a good case scenario after all.

We at Illusio predict that the accelerating pace of change in Singapore and its environs mean that however reticent, Wong will end up discussing, presenting, and spearheading more changes than Lee did during his tenure. He will triage them into 3 categories of "problem imminent, fix now", "rethink needed, commission studies", and "kick the can down the road", based on the expected lifespan of his prime ministership and cabinet and the timeline of the problem. And senior minister Lee will just endorse his decision, if Wong ever needs his thumb on the scale.